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**MULTINATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES  
- A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE?  
EXPERIENCE AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE GERMAN ARMY**

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# **MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES - A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE?**

## **EXPERIENCE AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE GERMAN ARMY**

### **SUMMARY**

This paper explores the extent to which the principle of multinationality should influence future military force structures.

Unlike the Cold-War era when massive forces were necessary to counter the WP threat in an assumed short warning scenario, the changed security environment requires smaller, but highly mobile, multi-purpose forces. The use of military forces today and in future will occur in almost every case as a multinational effort to contain conflicts and to keep or enforce peace.

Germany has promoted multinational force structures very strongly for a variety of reasons since fundamental changes in Europe were indicated. It contributes to all multinational formations of all types in Central Europe from brigade up to corps level. Experience from these formations indicates the great political and military value of multinationality whilst highlighting the significance of the degree to which multinationality is implemented in practice. The approaches to deep integration in the Franco-German Brigade and in I (GE/NL) Corps have resulted in remarkable progress and can be regarded as test cases for further European military integration. But they demand tremendous effort even under favourable conditions.

Multinational corps headquarters designed to the "integration-model" are therefore recommended for the enhancement of multinationality in Europe and to foster the military integration process of NATO's future new member nations.

## INTRODUCTION

1. Force Structures are no end in themselves, rather they are designed for a pre-determined purpose. If the environment is changing, they have to be adapted. The aims of security policy ought to form the framework for all structural and organisational considerations. It is therefore not surprising that the fundamental security-political changes in this decade have had significant effects on military force structures. The most obvious implication has been the drastic reduction of forces in the aftermath of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany. Most governments tried to get their peace dividend as quickly as possible.

2. But the end of the East-West-Conflict also allowed the Armed Forces to be licked into a different shape. Massive forces, which were able to cope with large scale offensive operations after a short period of warning, were not necessary any longer. Therefore NATO decided in summer 1990 to reduce standing forces significantly and rely more on reserves.<sup>1</sup> This broad outline was specified by the Defence Planning Committee in its session of May 1991.<sup>2</sup>

3. Beside the categorisation of forces into Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defence Forces and Augmentation Forces, the Ministers agreed for different reasons to establish several multinational corps in the Central Region. Military arguments, as well as political considerations, determined the decision making process. Although the composition of forces has already been changed several times, the idea of multinationality, as a basic principle of modern forces, has increased further.

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<sup>1</sup> See the "London Declaration", NATO Ministerial Communiqué London, 5-6 July 1990, paragraph 14.

<sup>2</sup> See NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, particularly paragraph 9.

4. Germany strongly supported the idea of multinationality right from the beginning and has contributed to all multinational formations in the Central Region for years. In some cases, establishing multinational formations played an important role as a symbolic trailblazer for a desired political development. At the same time, however, their military efficiency has to be assessed. The time has now come to evaluate initial experience with these formations and to draw conclusions for the future.

5. This research paper looks first into the general requirements for force structures, illuminates the original aims for multinational forces and investigates the changes of situation in the meantime. It describes the different models of multinationality, using the example of the German Army's commitment, and evaluates the experience of this commitment for peacetime routine and operations.

## **AIM**

6. The aim of this paper is to examine the possibilities and limitations of the principle of multinationality, and to determine to what extent this principle should influence future NATO military force structures.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **1 - GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE STRUCTURES**

7. Force structures should meet many different, sometimes even contradictory, demands. First of all, they have to take into account the circumstances of possible operations, particularly the most likely ones. Therefore they should be designed in a manner which optimises the co-ordination of all necessary means in combined arms operations.

Because the purpose and nature of operations can differ widely and thus demand different compositions of forces, it is vital that a force structure offers a high degree of flexibility. In nearly all cases the composition of formations for a specific operation has to be 'tailored to the mission',<sup>3</sup> nevertheless peacetime composition should be as similar as possible to the most likely combat structure. Close co-operation in routine training makes co-operation in operations much easier and is often a key to success. On the other hand, friction in co-operation of forces, on top of the pressures arising from many unexpected incidents in wartime, would put additional stress on the command organisation. The consequence is often confusion, and sometimes even chaos. Lack of understanding between units and lack of information are further reasons for avoidable losses and fratricide. The closest possible co-operation in daily routine training and exercises in peacetime are the best means of minimising this friction.

8. Moreover, the structure of armed forces should be in line with the political aims and strategic objectives of the respective nation or organisation, to provide the means to implement those objectives on the one hand, but to prevent incorrect and unwelcome perceptions on the other hand. False perceptions of a government's political intentions can cause, and have often caused, responses which by themselves may again provoke reactions in a countermove. Thus stability can be undermined. Therefore, the structure of armed forces must not be determined exclusively by operational considerations.

9. Because armed forces must be designed to implement political aims and strategic objectives, the effects of force structures on these aims must also be considered carefully.

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<sup>3</sup> General Sir Michael Walker, Commander in Chief (UK) Land Command, underlined this principle in his briefing for the RCDS in Wilton on 1 May 1998.

More than before, future force structures have to reflect: the organisational changes of the political systems in the world; the trend toward larger communities of states in many regions, particularly in Europe; and possibly the inherent change of the current character of the nation state.

10. In Europe the enlargement of NATO, the development of the WEU and - especially - the process of European unification will affect the organisation of forces in manifold respects. The transfer of sovereignty in many areas to common, trans-national, institutions and the gradual development of a common European foreign and security policy create for the first time favourable and promising conditions for the coordinated division of labour between the armed forces of different countries. A division of labour might be the first step towards united armed forces at the end of the day.

11. The most important driving factor for such a development is the pressure on military budgets in all European countries in the post-Cold-War era, which no longer permits the maintenance of high standard military forces at a reasonable scale in all areas. Moreover, most efficient use of the small budgets available requires internal processes to optimise procedures as well as force structures. Future force structures must therefore become more adaptable and more flexible. They need to be less centralised, delegate more economic responsibility to lower levels of the military command and control structure, and resemble more closely structures in commerce and industry.

12. In Central Europe the influence of geographical features on structure and location of forces has also changed. When forward defence was a crucial factor for the operational concept in this region, most units had to cover a specific sector and could be designed, to a certain extent, for the battle in that particular terrain.

They had to be located as close as possible to their respective defensive positions. Today there is much more freedom of action for using the terrain in case of a major attack and more time to deploy forces. Nevertheless, forces for different kinds of terrain should be available to increase operational capability. In peace missions the terrain conditions of the area covered have to be accepted as they are. The road network and the safe load of bridges have to be taken into account, and sometimes there are also political limitations on the deployment of armoured units. Also in this field, however, a sensible division of labour between countries with different force structures is possible and has often been practised.

13. Moreover, the location, and sometimes even the structure, of military forces is affected by a variety of internal political considerations.<sup>4</sup> Senior military planners have to ensure that operational capability is not degraded by such considerations and must point out the additional costs. Running costs are scrutinised very carefully in the armed forces of most countries, and new instruments have been developed to assign costs to individual units and tasks. Even more important are cost factors when a new organisation is set up or when an existing organisation is to be restructured. Financial efficiency is an increasingly crucial factor for military structures.

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<sup>4</sup> An interesting example is the restructuring of the German Army at the end of 1994. Initial military advice was to use the downsizing of the army for a significant reduction of major formations in order to establish strong units able to provide continuously a high availability of personnel for training, as well as for operations, with relatively low running costs. As a consequence many garrisons would have been given up. The *Bundesminister der Verteidigung* (Secretary of Defence) decided, however, to limit the changes of the structure to the minimum. The official argument said that a conscript army had to be present in as many parts of the country as possible to give soldiers with a limited period of service the opportunity to serve in their home area and to facilitate bonds with local communities. Actually the Government, which had only a small majority in Parliament, wanted to minimise the trouble inherent in dissolving garrisons.

The higher running costs of a higher number of garrisons than militarily necessary have never been questioned and never calculated, because all Members of Parliament, the Federal States, and the local government demanded the maintenance of a military presence in their respective regions. An investigation by the financial watchdog (Federal Budget Office) fizzled out.



14. Last, but not least, military structures have to be 'acceptable'. Not only do they obviously need the formal approval of Parliament in a democracy, but the public also has to be equally convinced that the military organisation is adequate and meets its objectives. And the needs and aspirations of the people within armed forces also have to be satisfied. This is not only an important social factor, but also crucial for the attractiveness of forces, for their regeneration and for the quality of the personnel they recruit.

## **2 - REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE STRUCTURES IN THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY SITUATION**

15. Setting up security alliances with a common military command structure in peacetime is a relatively new development. By World War II, nation states used to base their security precautions mainly on their own resources. Military alliances were established dependent on the requirements of the day. In case of war, the armies of allied countries used to operate predominantly in different areas with only loose contacts and liaison at the top level of command, and often suffering from the limited means of communications of the old days. Even on those occasions when armies fought together on the same battlefield, a common, single headquarters was seldom established. Nevertheless, there are a few examples of very close co-operation in commanding allied troops such as between the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugen of Savoyen at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>5</sup>

16. The decisive leap in developing a multinational command structure in peacetime was made after World War II in establishing permanent, integrated military NATO Headquarters.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> A famous example of this close co-operation is the battle of Blenheim (in German historiography: Höchstädt) in 1704.

<sup>6</sup> See NATO Ministerial Communiqué New York, 26 September 1950: "The Council agreed upon the establishment at the earliest possible date of an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe."

The main aim of the Alliance was to defend the member countries against aggression by the Soviet Union and their allies, with highly mobile forces. This required not only very close co-operation between the armed forces of all member nations, and collective defence planning, but also a command structure which was able to assume operational command or control for all formations assigned within a very short period of time.

17. Depth in the integrated command structure depended on the operational concept of forward defence with a composition of forces in Central Europe sometimes called the 'layer cake'. The whole border with the Warsaw Pact (WP) countries was covered by adjacent corps which, with one exception,<sup>7</sup> were purely national. That meant that the level above the corps, i.e. the Army Group level, had to consist of integrated NATO headquarters. This system worked very well during the whole period of the Cold War. Co-operation between adjacent corps of different nations was very close and trained in many multinational exercises, occasionally with cross-attached units mainly at division or brigade level. An Immediate Reaction Force, the Allied Mobile Force (AMF), however, consisting of smaller units of different nationality and able to show as many flags as possible at the start of an emerging crisis was intended to convey to the possible aggressor the impression that any conflict would involve NATO as a whole.

18. In the late 80s, when the tensions between NATO and the WP were decreasing, NATO considered maintaining high readiness only in parts of the active forces, and reducing it for the majority of forces.

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<sup>7</sup> Corps LANDJUT was formed by Danish and German formations.

To be able to deploy forces of substantial size and with all components necessary for the particular situation at the very beginning of a conflict, multinational forces below Army Group level seemed to be necessary.<sup>8</sup> NATO's Heads of State and Government declared at their London summit of July 1990:

*“As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:*

***NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It **will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.** NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, ... NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.**”<sup>9</sup>*

These general statements eventually led to the more detailed concept expressed in NATO's Defence Planning Committee's (DPC) spring meeting at Ministerial level in Brussels in 1991:

*“We have agreed the basis of a new force structure consisting of Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces, including multinational forces of all types: land, air and maritime. In particular we have agreed various national contributions to the multinational corps of Main Defence Forces for which detailed planning will now proceed.*

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<sup>8</sup> First considerations were discussed at the NATO DPC meeting at Ministerial level in Brussels in May 1990. See Communiqué of this meeting, paragraph 9: “Looking towards the longer term we attach particular importance to a study ... into the possibilities for greater use of multinational forces.”

<sup>9</sup> NATO Ministerial Communiqué London, 5-6 July 1990 (the London Declaration), paragraph 14. Emphasised by the author.

*With regard to Reaction Forces, we have agreed that these should consist of immediate and rapid reaction forces, comprising contributions from most NATO nations and including national as well as multinational formations.*<sup>10</sup>

19. At the same meeting the Ministers agreed in particular to create

*“a Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe, under United Kingdom command with a multinational headquarters. These forces, together with our future air and maritime force structures, will provide the basis for the flexible deployment of a range of forces depending on the situation.”*<sup>11</sup>

In this context, Ministers decided also to establish a Multinational Division (Airmobile) for the Central Region which had been under consideration since 1988.<sup>12</sup> A pendant to it for the Southern Region was recommended later.

20. Thus far the creation of multinational formations at corps and division level reflected the changed security situation in Europe. The reductions of forces in the aftermath of the CFE treaty and the lower readiness status of the bulk of them, as well as the significantly prolonged warning time, and a leaner integrated NATO command structure, permitting dissolution of the Army Group level, led to a partial transfer of integrated command structures to the next lower level, the corps. Moreover these changes required highly mobile rapid reaction forces, composed of units from different nations.

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<sup>10</sup> NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 28-29 May 1991, paragraph 9.

<sup>11</sup> See footnote 8; by the way, considerations of streamlining and adapting NATO's command structure to the new situation were discussed for the first time at the same meeting.

<sup>12</sup> See NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 1-2 December 1988: “We have agreed that a study should be undertaken ... which will examine the feasibility of forming a multinational division.”

See also NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 28-29 November 1989, paragraph 10: “We also received a progress report on an examination ... into the potential for the establishment of a multinational airmobile division composed of European forces in the Northern Army Group area ...”

21. The establishment of the EURO-Corps (initially called the Franco-German Corps) cannot directly be seen in the same context. The arguments in favour of this corps were neither military strategic nor operational, but political. Germany's main idea was to tie France closer to NATO, and indeed there were many signs in France at that time which seemed to promise an opportunity for France's rejoining NATO's integrated military command structure. Without such an approach, which included the strengthening of the role of the WEU, it would have been difficult to establish the strong European pillar in NATO's defence posture that had often been demanded, not least by the United States. NATO's Ministers for Foreign Affairs declared at their Copenhagen meeting in June 1991:

*"The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance."*<sup>13</sup>

22. Nevertheless, there were many suspicions in the United States, as well as in the United Kingdom, that the rationale behind this development was an attempt to diminish US influence on European affairs.<sup>14</sup> And indeed it is a difficult balancing act to develop an European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)<sup>15</sup> whilst keeping the United States involved in the security of the continent.

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<sup>13</sup> See NATO Ministerial Communiqué Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991. The whole paragraph covering this issue (1) is quoted in the Annex as No. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Policy in the Pentagon expressed American uneasiness at the Munich Security Conference 1992. See Haglund, David *"Who's afraid of Franco-German Military Cooperation?"*. European Security, Volume 2, Number 4, Winter 1993, P. 612.

See also NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 26 and 27 May 1992, paragraph 6. This paragraph is quoted in the Annex as No. 2. Not even the diplomatic language of NATO's communiqués could fully conceal the intensive and sometimes controversial debate about this subject.

The public discussion is described in detail in Foster, Edward, *The Franco-German Corps: A 'Theological' Debate?*. RUSI Journal, Vol.137/4, August 1992, pages 63-67 and also in Stein, George, *The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture*. European Security, Volume 2, Number 2, Summer 1993, page 212.

<sup>15</sup> Compare Sammet, H.H., *The Development of the European Security and Defence Identity towards a Common Defence Policy and a Common Defence*. RCDS 1995.

The broad expectations of France's full return into NATO's integrated military organisation did not happen, but at least France's ties to the military structure of NATO have become much closer than before. After long and difficult negotiations, closer links between NATO and WEU, as well as a certain division of labour between both organisations, were established.<sup>16</sup> The EURO-Corps was made available to WEU and NATO according to an agreement between the French and German Chiefs of Defence Staffs and SACEUR in January 1993. In advance of this agreement the Defence Ministers of all NATO nations eventually appreciated the establishment of this headquarters in their December meeting in 1992.<sup>17</sup>

23. In the meantime, it is generally agreed that the existing multinational formations enhance NATO's and (W)EU's political options and operational capabilities. This assessment gained still more importance when NATO, and potentially the WEU, had to take over new responsibilities in peace operations after the war in the former Yugoslavia. This demonstrated United Nations' limitations in handling peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations in violent conflicts of such an extent. NATO became aware of these new challenges as early as 1992, when the DPC declared in December 1992:

*“The Alliance will continue to play a major role in encouraging and underpinning stability in Europe. Because of its transatlantic dimension, its experience and its unique military structures and capabilities, NATO is well placed to assist the UN and CSCE in their efforts to contain and resolve escalating regional conflicts in Europe. The continuing process of adapting Alliance structures to the new security environment will further improve NATO's capabilities in this respect.”<sup>18</sup>*

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<sup>16</sup> See NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 11 December 1992: The paragraph covering this issue (6) is quoted in the Annex as No. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., paragraph 7, quoted in the Annex as No. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., paragraph 14.

24. In peace operations a very broad participation of different nations is desired in order to demonstrate the firm determination of the community of nations to terminate hostilities and to support solutions of the conflict. Therefore the forces committed in such operations have to be multinational in almost every case. Every troop-providing nation naturally expects, whatever its contribution may be, to be equitably represented in the command structure. To establish headquarters out of nothing in a reasonable period of time is apparently impossible. Existing multinational headquarters in which a high number of troop-providing nations is represented are better suited to acting as a framework for the required command structure than national headquarters because of political, psychological, and military reasons. Experience in co-operation between members of different nations achieved by daily routine is indispensable.<sup>19</sup> To integrate additional staff personnel in a well functioning structure takes time, but is possible.

25. In the meantime, the force structures of NATO have largely been adapted to the changed security situation in Europe and to meeting new tasks and challenges. NATO has developed a concept for using existing headquarters as a framework for operational headquarters including personnel of all nations involved in the respective scenario. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept also allows these headquarters to be made available to both organisations, NATO and WEU, depending on which is in the lead.

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<sup>19</sup> During the Partnership for Peace exercise CO-OPERATIVE LANTERN of the 1.(GE) Panzerdivision in Lower Saxony in September 1996 two multinational brigade headquarters were established. One of them consisted of officers and NCOs from four or five different nations who had never worked together before and were not familiar with NATO procedures. The appointed Brigade Commander, a French officer, described the apparent problems of getting the staff functioning properly within a few days as "significant". Asked how long it would take to achieve reasonable standards, he estimated an eight-week period of time at minimum. See also Friese, Matthias H., *Partnerschaft für den Frieden - Multinationalität über Grenzen hinweg*, Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, page 48.

The Heads of State and Government of NATO endorsed this approach at their summit in Madrid in July 1997, which marked the conclusion of the development of NATO's military command structure at this level, at least for the time being.<sup>20</sup>

### **3 - CURRENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY IN MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES**

#### **Traditional forms of multinationality in NATO**

26. Germany has taken part in the integrated NATO command structure since joining NATO in 1955. Apart from a few, minor units of the military basic organisation and some elements of the home defence force, all major formations of the German Army have been assigned to NATO. Moreover, the Central Region's planned order of battle for the defence of Central Europe, as mentioned above, demanded close co-operation between German units and those of different nationalities at corps boundaries. 7. (GE) Panzer Division for example, as an operational reserve for the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), had pre-planned options in the sectors of all corps deployed in the NORTHAG area. There was almost no exercise in this division without units of at least one different nation. In some cases, German units were subordinated to non-German corps headquarters for operational reasons, e.g. 12. (GE) Panzer Division to V (US) Corps.

27. There has been one exception to the rule of national corps headquarters, however, the bi-national Danish-German corps headquarters Allied Land Forces in Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT) in the BALTAP area. It was based on the Oslo Treaty of 1961 and became operational one year later in 1962.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See NATO Ministerial Communiqué Madrid, 8 July 1997. The paragraphs covering this issue (3 and 17) are quoted in the Annex as No. 5 and 6.

<sup>21</sup> See Gerber, Manfred "*Korps LANDJUT*". Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, pages 18-21; Lieutenant General Manfred Gerber was Commanding General LANDJUT from 1995 to March 1998.



The Danish Jutland Division, 6. (GE) Panzergrenadier Division and additional corps units of both nations were assigned to this corps headquarters. Besides, the German Army provided units for SACEUR's Immediate Reaction Forces, for the brigade-size Allied Mobile Force (Land) as well as for the NATO Composite Force. Incidentally, the German Air Force and Navy have similarly contributed to their respective Reaction Forces.

28. Notwithstanding these manifold connections between Allied land forces in the Central Region, multinationality in organisational terms had mainly been practised at Army Group level and above. Apart from LANDJUT, the wartime commitment of 12. (GE) Panzer Division, and the contribution to SACEUR's Immediate Reaction Forces, German Army units had been organised in national corps by the end of the 80s. The fundamental change of security circumstances in Europe, the process of European unification and the prospect of German unification significantly affected considerations about German Army's future force structure at that time.

### **The Franco-German Brigade**

29. The first step to a more multinational future force structure for the German Army, however, had already been taken some years earlier in 1987, with the creation of the Franco-German Brigade. The rationale behind this decision was predominantly political. Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the President François Mitterrand agreed to found a common French-German security council and a common brigade-size formation whilst visiting a joint German-French army exercise at corps level.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> On 25 September 1987 during the German-French Corps Exercise "Kecker Spatz". Both institutions were formally agreed by French and German governments on 22 January 1988. The inaugural session of the "German-French Council for Defence and Security" took place on 20 April 1989 in Paris.

Their intention was to demonstrate the high degree of common interest and consensus on all political aspects of French-German co-operation and to give this co-operation a new impetus. This initiative gained the approval of a broad majority in both countries, whereas abroad the reaction was one of consent and interest, but also scepticism and cynicism.<sup>23</sup>

30. A combined military unit has, of course, high visibility and high symbolic value. At the same time, the creation of such a unit provided an additional and politically plausible justification for creating a common security council, because decisions about the design of this formation and its deployment required formalisation through an established body. Indeed, there was a need for such a formalised bi-national institution in any case, since France had located significant troops in Germany and had nuclear forces available, which could be deployed, because of their range, only on German territory. These forces were not fully integrated into NATO's military decision making process.<sup>24</sup>

31. The German Army Staff had initially been reluctant to create this brigade because of the significant practical problems in running such a unit, owing to different laws, different traditions, and different military cultures. Nevertheless, all preparatory measures were forced through in such a way that enabled the brigade to become operational on 17 October 1990.

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<sup>23</sup> The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher commented: "utter tokenism, an initiative for the gallery"; quoted according to Haglund, David, l.c., page 615. See also Stein, George, l.c., page 209.

<sup>24</sup> At that time France was represented in NATO's Military Committee only by a high-ranking liaison officer who was not authorised to take part in the discussions and to express the opinions of his government. Representation in NATO's military headquarters was similar.

According to the author's own experience as Military Assistant to the German Chief of Defence Staff at that time, discussions in the French-German Defence and Security Council's meetings, however, had only minimal results (apart from problems of the Franco-German Brigade) and were often disappointing at least from a German point of view.

The brigade has a bi-national headquarters with rotational posts for the most important positions<sup>25</sup> and a bi-national Logistic Battalion. It has full command over two French and two German battalions. The brigade is located in three garrisons in Southern Germany close to the French-German border. The working languages are German and French. Never before has a brigade-size formation been established by two nations with joint command not only for operations, but also in peacetime. Despite many practical problems, which have been mainly overcome in the meantime, the brigade is now a fully operational formation, which experienced its “baptism of fire“ in the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina last year.

### **New requirements**

32. The unification of Germany, however, required measures which were even more radical. From the very earliest stage, once unification became a real possibility, German military and political leaders started to consider how to overcome predictable reservations in the Soviet Union and Eastern European states, as well as some NATO members, about a bigger and inherently more powerful Germany. Broader integration of major German military formations into multinational force structures, thus avoiding the perception of a too-powerful nation at the Centre of Europe, was regarded as a sensible idea to diminish these objections. Moreover, multinational force structures could create a new rationale for continuing to station foreign troops in Germany. As ever the continuing presence of a significant quantity of NATO forces in Germany was seen as politically and militarily necessary, but this could be questioned in view of the retreat of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany. These particular German considerations met the organisational and operational reasons discussed in NATO in 1990 and 1991 as mentioned above.

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<sup>25</sup> The Commander is a Brigadier General level, the Deputy Brigade Commander a Colonel level and there is a Chief of Staff also at Colonel level. The rotational period is two years.

33. The diverse political and military conditions for differing types of forces, and varying degrees of willingness of nations to harmonise their own national interests, traditions, doctrines, and structures with respective partner nations, required a range of solutions for the intended multinational headquarters, in particular with different depths of integration. The ways in which multinational formations are organised reflect these differences. Thus almost every multinational corps headquarters in the Central Region has a different structure. Nevertheless three main models can be distinguished: the “lead-nation model”, the “framework model”, and the “integration model”.<sup>26</sup>

34. Headquarters that follow the “lead-nation model” are principally composed nationally, but designed to command forces of one or more different nationalities. Some officers of these nations are assigned to the respective headquarters to improve its abilities in commanding the subordinate units of other nationalities in operations. Even then operational doctrines, training, and logistics remain national responsibilities. This model does not include command and control in peacetime and apparently introduces the least degree of interference in national responsibilities.

## **II (GE/US) Corps and V (US/GE) Corps**

35. II (GE/US) Corps and V (US/GE) Corps, both designated as Main Defence Forces, established their multinational character in 1993 and are examples of this model. After transfer of authority in the case of NATO defence, II (GE/US) Corps takes operational command over 1. (US) Armored Division, and V (US/GE) Corps over 5. (GE) Panzer Division. Five officers and one NCO are cross-posted in the respective corps headquarters.

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<sup>26</sup> Compare Steinaecker, Günter Frhr. v., *The German Army As A Partner In Multinational Major Formations*, Military Technology, Vol. XXI, October 1997, page 90.

Moreover, there are several additional connections between the two corps and their cross-assigned units, such as regular mutual information, joint exercises, participation in training programmes particularly aimed at multinationality, and twinning arrangements.<sup>27</sup>

36. In principle, this kind of bi-national command is not new. The former 12. (GE) Panzer Division had been assigned similarly to V (US) Corps for decades. With NATO's general concept for multinational force structures in 1991 this arrangement, however, became more formalised. Although the model works well, differences between the two mutually assigned divisions are apparent and make co-operation more difficult, particularly in the case of 5. (GE) Panzer Division. This division is combined with Military District Command IV in peacetime and depends on mobilisation,<sup>28</sup> whereas V (US/GE) Corps, as the only US corps stationed abroad, is highly mobile with a wide variety of additional missions in a purely national context. All in all, there is no apparent military reason for this cross-assignment of divisions, apart from the "educational effect" of being involved in a multinational environment, which might be sufficiently important in the current security situation to justify the inherent disadvantages.

### **ACE Rapid Reaction Corps**

37. Multinationality is practised to a higher extent in corps headquarters organised according to the "framework model".<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> See Trost, Edgar *Multinationalität II. (GE/US) Korps*. Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, page 28; Lieutenant General Edgar Trost, now *Stellvertreter des Inspektors des Heeres* (Deputy Chief of Staff German Army) had been Commanding General of the II (GE/US) Corps by 30 Sept 1996.

<sup>28</sup> In peacetime, the national territorial tasks of a military district command as well as the traditional operational tasks of a division are performed by a common command in the German Army with only one exception (14. Panzergrenadier Division). In war, this consolidation is revoked: the divisions will then report to the NATO commands, while the military district commands will report to the Army Forces Command.

<sup>29</sup> This terminology is not always used consistently in military publications. Some experts, for instance, describe the UK as "lead nation" of the ARRC, see: Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge GCB *"The Roles and Challenges of the British Armed Forces"*. Defence and International Security, RUSI Journal February 1996, page 5.

They are also dominated by one nation, which is responsible for infrastructure, administration, and running the headquarters. It also provides the core of the personnel, but nevertheless a significant share of the staff is provided by the other participating nations.

38. The example for this model is the United Kingdom-led ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)<sup>30</sup> stationed in Germany, which forms the largest element of NATO's crisis reaction forces. The 13 nations involved have earmarked a total of 10 divisions for assignment, two of them, i.e. Multinational Divisions Central and South, in peacetime. The ARRC headquarters consists of all 13 nations that provide troops for this major formation. Whilst 60 per cent of staff personnel is provided by the United Kingdom, the remaining staff positions are distributed among the nations according to their contributions. Germany has assigned its 7. Panzer Division and Air Mobile Brigade 31 as part of Multinational Division (Central), both formations consisting of Reaction Forces. The German Army holds one General position in the ARRC headquarters. ARRC was committed in the meantime in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the ground element of the Implementation Forces (IFOR) of the Dayton Peace Accord from November 1995 to December 1996, and proved convincingly that it was able to meet all challenges of a particularly difficult operation.<sup>31</sup>

## **LANDJUT**

39. The "Integration Model" is implemented, however in different formats, in the bi-national LANDJUT Corps and 1 (GE/NL) Corps as well as in the EURO-Corps, which now consists of four nations.

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<sup>30</sup> See Walker, Michael, *Multinationalität auf dem Prüfstand*. Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, pages 12-17; General Michael Walker, now Commander in Chief UK Land Command, was Commanding General of the ARRC from December 1994 to 1997

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, page 14.

LANDJUT, as mentioned above, is a remarkable example for a multinational corps, because it had already existed for almost 30 years when NATO took its decisions on multinational force structures in 1991. Germany and Denmark formed this corps with comparable contributions of forces as well as staff personnel. Staff positions were equitably distributed among both nations, the most important positions, i.e. the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff, being rotational posts for a period of three years. The German Army changed its main contribution recently when it assigned 14. Panzergrenadier Division, located mainly in Eastern Germany, to LANDJUT, after having dissolved 6. Panzergrenadier Division, the former contribution to this corps.<sup>32</sup> The working language is English.

40. New prospects for this corps arose with the imminent NATO membership of Poland. Denmark and Germany invited Poland to join this corps, whose headquarters will then be stationed in Szczecin (Stettin), as a NATO member in 1999. The principles of this corps, however, will be unchanged, i.e. similar contribution of troops and staff personnel. The corps will have an additional Deputy Commander, however, to allow for continuing participation of all three nations in the rotation of the then three posts of the command group. The three nations agreed to assign a division each for operations, but to leave peacetime command to the nations as it has been up to now.

### **The EURO-Corps**

41. The EURO-Corps was first created as a bi-national Corps by Germany and France based on the decisions of the German-French summit of La Rochelle in 1992.<sup>33</sup> Militarily there was no reason to establish an additional corps headquarters in the area of Southern Germany/East France at that time.

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<sup>32</sup> See Gerber, Manfred, l.c., page 18-21.

<sup>33</sup> The annual German-French summit 1992 took place in La Rochelle (France) on 22 May 1992.

In the aftermath of German unification and as a consequence of the Caucasus agreement between President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl, the unified Germany had to reduce its armed forces from about 460,000 military personnel of the *Bundeswehr* and about 110,000 of the *Nationale Volksarmee* to an overall size of 370,000.<sup>34</sup> That meant the army had to dissolve five divisions in the old *Bundesländer* and establish two divisions and a corps headquarters in the new *Länder*.<sup>35</sup> Because of this reduction of divisions and some additional structural changes, II (GE/US) Corps would have had to command three German divisions in peacetime,<sup>36</sup> which is an operationally favourable number. Establishing a bi-national German-French corps headquarters, however, was mainly driven by two political reasons.

42. After the fundamental security-political changes in Europe, many voices in France said that its special role in NATO was not appropriate any longer. German political and military leaders saw an opportunity to bring France back into NATO's military integration. It soon became clear, however, that such a development would have its price. That was to respond to a certain extent to the French intention to enhance Europe's influence vis à vis the United States by strengthening the political role of the WEU and building up its own military capabilities.

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<sup>34</sup> The decisive conditions of German unification were agreed between Germany and the Soviet Union in a meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl and their foreign ministers on 17 July 1990 in Shelesnovodsk. In reaction to the Soviet concession to withdraw all Soviet troops from Eastern Germany by 1994, Chancellor Helmut Kohl undertook to reduce the German *Bundeswehr* to a size of 370,000.

This declaration became binding in international law by the Treaty of Paris of 21 November 1990. At that time force levels were not part of the Vienna CFE treaty. Before this agreement the Federal Republic of Germany had planned to reduce her armed forces according to the improved security situation to a level of 400,000, or 420,000 should the Vienna CFE negotiations fail.

<sup>35</sup> Due to the so called "2+4-Treaty" between the two German states and the occupation powers, this corps had to keep outside NATO as long as Soviet forces were stationed in Eastern Germany. Moreover this Treaty prohibits the stationing of foreign forces in Eastern Germany, which is why this corps (IV Corps) cannot be included in multinational formations.

<sup>36</sup> 1. *Gebirgsdivision* (Mountain Division), 10. Panzer Division and 5. Panzer Division, which is assigned to V (US/GE) Corps for operations.



There were many reservations in Germany about this policy, because it was perceived as abandonment of the United States and playing into their isolationists' hands. But on the other hand, such a development would be totally in line with the process of European unification and the medium term aim of creating a European Security and Defence Identity.<sup>37</sup> Despite these concerns, Chancellor Kohl finally decided to take the risk.

43. The second reason was to solve the problem which the French side saw in the continued stationing of French troops in Germany after 1994, when Russian troops would have left the country. Despite the German invitation to keep the French units in their garrisons in Germany, President Mitterand ruled it out under the current conditions.<sup>38</sup> The existence of a combined corps, however, seemed to offer an adequate rationale for stationing the troops assigned to this corps on German soil.<sup>39</sup> Consequently the Supreme Command of French Forces in Germany located in Baden-Baden was dissolved in August 1993<sup>40</sup> and the II (FR) Corps left Germany at the same time. A few months later the then EURO-Corps was commissioned.<sup>41</sup> In the meantime, Belgium had joined the German-French initiative, Spain followed 1994 and Luxembourg 1996.

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<sup>37</sup> See footnote 13 referring to NATO Ministerial Communiqué Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991.

<sup>38</sup> Compare Rühl, Lothar, *Sicherheit in Europa - Zur Stabilität ohne Instabilität* in Wellershoff, Dieter (Editor), *Frieden ohne Macht? - Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte im Wandel*. Bonn, Bouvier Verlag 1991, page 201.

See also Palin, Roger, H., *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*. Adelphi Papers No. 294, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, April 1955, page 11.

<sup>39</sup> On the other hand Germany did not want to be singularised as the only host country for foreign troops and intended to station some German troops in France at least at a symbolic level. This was one of the reasons to station the new corps headquarters in Strasbourg and to establish common training facilities. In the meantime both countries have agreed to build up a common helicopter school in Le Luc, France to train pilots for the new battle helicopter "Tiger".

<sup>40</sup> By the German Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe, and his French colleague, François Léotard, in Rastatt on 27 August 1993.

<sup>41</sup> In the presence of the German, French and Belgian Ministers of Defence on the 5 November 1993 in Strasbourg. The first Commanding General became the German Lieutenant General Helmut Willmann.

Apart from Luxembourg, which contributes a Recce Company, each country involved provides one armoured division.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the German-Franco Brigade and a French Signal Regiment are assigned to this Corps.<sup>43</sup> All formations assigned with a size of more than 50,000 soldiers remain under national command, whereas the Commanding General EURO-Corps exercises OPCOM in operations. Within the headquarters German and French are used on an equal basis, Dutch (Flemish) is the 3<sup>rd</sup>, Spanish the 4<sup>th</sup> official language. Staff posts are distributed to the nations in a fixed allocation, the six most important top positions rotating between the contributing nations.<sup>44</sup>

44. Whereas the build-up of the corps headquarters occurred without major problems and in a very short time,<sup>45</sup> argument about the political and military implications of this corps caused severe differences of opinion within NATO.<sup>46</sup> Reservations by the United States and the United Kingdom were eventually overcome by an agreement that made the EURO-Corps available to NATO and WEU missions at the turn of the year 1992 to 1993, as already described in chapter 2.

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<sup>42</sup> Spain started her contribution with a mechanised brigade; however, it will provide a division in 1998.

<sup>43</sup> See Meyers, Manfred *“Grundsätze und Perspektiven der Multinationalität”*. Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, pages 4-6.

<sup>44</sup> The six most important staff positions rotating among the nations involved are the Commanding General, the first Deputy Commanding General, the Chief of Staff and the heads of three staff divisions. The rotation period is two years. Moreover each of these nations is represented at the level of the Deputy Commanding Generals. The latter rule was criticised by Germany, because the staff thus became very top-heavy.

<sup>45</sup> It became operational in November 1995.

<sup>46</sup> The Financial Post commented the Franco-German Corps referring to the French-German summit: "The news from La Rochelle sounded like a diplomatic version of 'Yankee go home' "; quoted according to Haglund, David, l.c., page 621.

Compare also footnote 15,

Foster, Edward, l.c.,

Stein, George, l.c., and

Kamp, Karl-Heinz, *Ein Spaltpilz für das Atlantische Bündnis? Das deutsch-französische Eurokorps [A spirit of discord for the North Atlantic Alliance?]*. Europa-Archiv (GE), No. 15-16/1992, pages 649-655.

## **The German-Netherlands Corps**

45. Unlike the EURO-Corps, the genesis of the German-Netherlands Corps was dominated by military reasoning. Dutch military leaders realised in 1991 that a national corps headquarters could not be maintained after the inevitable downsizing of their army in the aftermath of such fundamental security-political changes. They came to the conclusion that participation at this level of command could only be kept on a bi-national or multinational basis. Germany was regarded as the most suitable partner, because a Dutch brigade has been stationed in Northern Germany for decades and the Dutch Army had always had a very close relationship with the German army in the past. Exploratory talks were initiated by the Dutch Chief of Defence Staff in a bi-lateral discussion with his German colleague during NATO's spring meeting in 1991.<sup>47</sup>

46. Of course, this corps had to reflect equal participation by both nations involved. Therefore the "integration model" was regarded as the only possible solution from the very beginning. Moreover, and unlike LANDJUT and later the EURO-Corps, this corps would also have to command the Dutch land forces and the German Army's forces in Northern Germany in peacetime, which had never been practised between nations before. The German Army Staff had some reservations in the beginning, not so much due to the idea of sharing command with the Dutch Army in this region in general, but because of the predictable range of practical problems in exercising command and control in such a design. The overarching principle of multinationality in NATO's new strategic concept, however, was regarded as so important that all practical problems, often caused by different legal regulations, had to be overcome.

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<sup>47</sup> The author took part in this bilateral meeting between General de Graaf (NL) and Admiral Wellershoff (GE) in May 1991.

47. For a short period a more comprehensive solution including LANDJUT was considered. But Denmark showed little interest in such a development, officially because of geographical reasons, actually because of concerns that the BALTAP area might be marginalised in such a constellation. Moreover, they might have regarded it as difficult to accept for their people, who often react rather sensitively in national questions, having Danish troops commanded by a multinational command in peacetime.

48. The formal basis for the new corps was established by a common declaration concerning a German-Netherlands Corps signed by the two Ministers of Defence in March 1993.<sup>48</sup> The terms of reference in more detail for the new corps were agreed between the Chiefs of both armies in April 1994.<sup>49</sup> The establishment of the corps headquarters benefited from the opportunity to use the existing headquarters of the I (GE) Corps in Münster, Westphalia as a nucleus for the bi-national headquarters which should be manned by equal contributions of personnel, with two-year rotational posts at the top level. The new formation was inaugurated by the Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok and the German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Münster in August 1995.<sup>50</sup> The Dutch Lieutenant General Ruurd Reitsma became first Commanding General.

49. The corps was designed to command a joint Command Support Group at brigade level, 1. (NL) Division and 1. (GE) Panzer Division as contract units.

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<sup>48</sup> Joint Resolution of the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany of 30 March 1993. The resolution was signed by the German Minister of Defence Volker Rühle and his Dutch colleague Relus ter Beek.

<sup>49</sup> Implementing Arrangement between the Chief of Staff of the Army of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Commander in Chief of the Army of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 22 April 1994.

<sup>50</sup> On 30 August 1995.

For organisational reasons, however, it was necessary to attach the 11. (NL) Air Assault Brigade and an army aviation regiment on the Dutch side as well as the 7. (GE) Panzer Division (in its role as a rapid reaction force assigned to the ARRC), an NCO School and an infrastructure staff on the German side to the corps only in terms of organisation. Understandably, this somewhat complicated construction created many additional remaining national tasks which made the functioning of this staff more difficult.

50. Despite the corps' intentionally high degree of integration,<sup>51</sup> organisation as well as command and control of the national contributions generally remain a national responsibility. The Commanding General, however, is authorised to exercise command and control over all 'contract units' as far as this makes sense under the legal and factual prerequisites, i.e. particularly in the fields of exercises, training, and even to a certain degree logistics, - *in loco parentis* of the respective nation. In contrast to NATO Commanders, who exercise operational command or control (after transfer of authority) on behalf of NATO, following approval of their missions by all member nations in the NATO Council (NAC), DPC or Military Committee of course, there is no permanent common body as superior authority for the Commanding General of I GE/NL Corps. He, with his much wider responsibility for units of both nations, is part of both and either national chains of command in peacetime, as described above.

51. Those tasks, remaining purely national for legal reasons, and the command and control of the additional non-contract units are exercised by the Commanding General and the Deputy Commanding General, as Senior National Officers, for the units of their respective nationality. Furthermore, in these cases staff work is exercised by the integrated corps headquarters.

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<sup>51</sup> Endorsed by the German and Dutch Secretary of Defence in the so-called Williamsburg Declaration on 5 October 1995.

Moreover both nations intended right from the beginning to reduce national reservations and legal restrictions pragmatically and step by step. The progress of those efforts towards deeper integration should be reviewed by both governments regularly. According to the recommendations of the “Progress Report 1996”,<sup>52</sup> the mission of the Corps headquarters was extended beyond the initial scope to become a ‘Force Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU)’.

52. Thus, it can be seen that the German Army contributes to all multinational army formations in Central Europe. Different political and military conditions have produced very different types of multinational force structures. Experience gained in multinational headquarters in recent years has already required some adaptations in the design of multinational forces. Further adaptations will become necessary in the wake of political efforts to create and enhance a European Security and Defence Identity, as well as in response to reductions and other changes in national military force structures.

#### **4 - REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE GAINED**

##### **Effects on sovereignty**

53. The most frequent argument against multinational force structures is their inherent implications for a nation state’s sovereignty. Regarded from a purely legal point of view, it can be questioned whether such structures really have an inevitable effect on the sovereignty of a state in every case. The integrated command structure of NATO, for example, does not affect the national authority to deploy forces, because NATO is an organisation of sovereign nations, rather than a supranational institution.

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<sup>52</sup> The first “Progress Report on Deeper Integration within the I (GE/NL) Corps” was forwarded to the Ministers of Defence of Germany and the Netherlands by 1 July 1996.

Every decision has to be taken unanimously. Thus every member state retains full responsibility for its troops in peacetime, as well as for the employment of NATO forces in operations after transfer of authority. On the other hand of course, personnel and materiel in integrated headquarters are not available for purely national tasks. And NATO force commitments can reduce their availability for other (national) purposes. Nevertheless, these commitments in general have not been regarded as significant constraints on sovereignty. Sovereignty, however, is more severely affected when forces themselves become integral parts of a multinational structure.<sup>53</sup> This “deep integration” enhances the dependence on common headquarters and forces of other nations, even if provisos ensure full availability for purely national tasks.

54. The “lead-nation model” for multinational formations has least impact on the national availability of forces. That is why the US were content to introduce this model for their V Corps in Germany and to contribute to the respective II German Corps.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, this model implies very limited effects on multinational aspirations. It is more of a political fig leaf than a militarily useful construction. Nevertheless, with regard to German unification and underpinning close relations with the US, the real political benefits of these corps might compensate for the military disadvantages of an otherwise unnecessary cross-assignment.

### **The “framework model”**

55. The “framework model” model for multinational headquarters, by and large, leaves the troop- and staff-contributing nations’ authority unaffected and provides at the same time a significantly higher degree of multinational participation.

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<sup>53</sup> Steinaecker, I.c., page 92.

<sup>54</sup> Compare Palin, Roger H., I.c., page 11.

Moreover, this model is flexible enough to incorporate personnel from further nations, if required for a specific operation. Headquarters designed according to this model, like the ARRC, are militarily effective, as shown recently by the employment of ARRC in the SFOR operation in former Yugoslavia. Because the framework nation maintains most of the essential staff positions and determines the staff's operating procedures, the causes of friction within an multinational environment are reduced to the minimum possible level.

56. On the other hand, this kind of multinationality implies that the other nations might not feel fairly represented. Regarding to the IFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia, Field Marshall Sir Peter Inge mentioned: *"We thought it very important that British soldiers were commanded by a primarily British HQ."*<sup>55</sup> This is certainly true, but applies to other nations as well. Therefore Germany has always preferred the "Integration Model" for a corps headquarters that acts not only as any NATO headquarters, but explicitly on behalf of NATO and consists of forces from all 13 nations. The design of the ARRC as framework headquarters was decided only after intensive, controversial discussions in NATO during 1991.<sup>56</sup> In the meantime, there are now more contributing nations than at that time. Moreover, experience of recent years has shown that the most likely and most frequent operations require a high degree of multinationality for military as well as political reasons. Any further development of this corps headquarters should therefore move in the direction of the "integration model".

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<sup>55</sup> Inge, Peter, l.c., page 5.

<sup>56</sup> Author's own experience as military assistant to the German Chief of Defence in the meetings of NATO's Military Committee 1991.



### **The “integration model”**

57. The “integration model” for multinational corps or division headquarters (without peacetime command and control over troops) extends long, positive experience with integrated NATO headquarters to other levels of command. It has an insignificant effect on the sovereignty and freedom of action of nations in the use of their forces, by virtue of the fact that nations which contribute to those headquarters might not have an additional corps headquarters available for national tasks. But occasions in which nations in Europe need a national headquarters for operations at corps level are hardly conceivable.

58. The “integration model”, like LANDJUT, the EURO-Corps, and LANDJUT’s designated successor (including Poland), allows a fair representation of the contributing nations in all important staff positions. Thus the identification of all nations involved with the respective formation is facilitated. The EURO-Corps, for example, has taken part several times in the traditional troop parade in Paris on French national day.<sup>57</sup> Even led by a German Commanding General, the French people regarded this Corps without reservations and as part of their own military identity. This shows that one of the intended political aims, i.e. the use of multinational formations to overcome national reservations, can be achieved in reality. The psychological role of the military in influencing national feelings, or a more multi-nationally flavoured manner of thinking, should not be underestimated. Thus military force structures can contribute in a very positive way to the European unification process.

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<sup>57</sup> At the first time on 14 July 1994.

## Deep integration

59. The latter effects are even stronger in case of deep integration, i.e. when forces are not only assigned to a multinational headquarters for operations, but also in peacetime. The experience of the Franco-German Brigade has shown that this unit is a place where young people of both nations meet and develop a better understanding of each other.<sup>58</sup> And the brigade, as intended by its originators, has become a symbol of the good neighbourliness of two countries which had been “hereditary enemies” for centuries.

60. On the other hand, it took considerable effort to get the formation to run reasonably well. The nature of emergent problems often required the involvement of both Ministries of Defence, in some cases even the Parliaments. Nevertheless, the level of this formation is too low to be regarded as a real motor for adapting the legal foundations for military service and for tactical and operational doctrines in both countries. This conclusion is even more valid following the French decision to abolish conscription.

61. Nevertheless, the brigade has proven its operational benefits in SFOR in former Yugoslavia, where a headquarters at brigade level derived from the Franco-German Brigade and stationed in Sarajevo commands French, German, Ukrainian, and Albanian units in the Multinational Division South-East.<sup>59</sup> It has demonstrated that an organic bi- or multinational formation is apparently much better suited for a multinational operation than an ad-hoc unit. It would not have been possible to establish a mixed Franco-German brigade-size formation from scratch or to assign a national German brigade to a French-led and French-speaking division headquarters.

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<sup>58</sup> Compare Klein, Paul, *Ende der Nationalarmee? [The demise of national armies?] - Die Bundeswehr auf dem Weg zur Multinationalität*, Information für die Truppe (GE), October/November 1995, page 96.

<sup>59</sup> Compare Raab, Peter, *Multinationalität zu viert*, Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung (GE), July/August 1997, pages 476-480.

62. The creation of I (GE/NL) Corps, also deeply integrated, could be developed from German experience gained with the German-Franco Brigade. The most significant problems have arisen from the varying legal status of soldiers of different nationalities, and from the difficulty of defining the commander's authority and responsibility. Notwithstanding the almost unanimous support of the German Parliament for the Franco-German Brigade as well as for the I (GE/NL) Corps, Members of Parliament have always been reluctant to accept restrictions on German soldiers' legal rights in order to create equal conditions in those formations. Nor are they willing to give up or reduce significantly their rights as the controlling authority for the Armed Forces. Apart from these reservations, it would be very difficult to agree equal standards with France and the Netherlands as well. The more partners are involved in deeply integrated formations, the more unlikely is a total consensus on regulations pertaining to legal rights and duties of military personnel. It should be possible, but has not happened yet, to resolve some minor legal problems, arising from different national laws regulating, for example, the use of weapons on guard duties. But as long as the more fundamental questions are not covered by pan-European law, the exercise of administrative command and control will have to remain a national responsibility.

63. This does not necessarily mean bypassing the commander of a national formation or excluding him from responsibility in this respect. Initial considerations concerning the status of a multinational force commander included the idea of supra-nationality in which he would receive directives and general guidelines from a common political body such as the German-French Council for Defence and Security. The case of the Franco-German Brigade soon proved that this was not practical. So many questions of more or less importance arose from the daily routine of this formation, that the Council was certainly not the appropriate level for dealing with them.

Eventually, a 'gaggle' of committees and sub-committees emerged, and many officials, officers and civil servants took pleasure in travelling between Bonn, Paris, and the garrison towns of the brigade. Fortunately, when the work for this formation was almost finished, their attention could be transferred to the nascent EURO-Corps.

64. In the meantime, the conviction has prevailed that the commander of a deeply integrated formation has to be almost fully integrated into the national chains of command of the nations involved. Purists might argue that such a procedure is not in line with the traditional military principle of unity of command. But actually this principle has already been eroded and is no longer tenable in a highly complex military environment, even in a purely national sense.

65. In the case of I (GE/NL) Corps, the Commanding General, irrespective of his nationality, is intended to report to both Chiefs of the Armies, i.e. the German "*Inspekteur des Heeres*", respectively the Dutch "*Bevelhebber van de Landstijdkrachten*".<sup>60</sup> To begin with, this procedure applied to that area explicitly defined as bi-national. But in advance of the intended extension of his responsibilities, the recommendations of the "Progress Report 1996" proposed that all national directives should be channelled without exception through him. The ultimate goal was "*to provide the Commander of the Corps ... with the full responsibility for the implementation of all directives issued by both nations*".<sup>61</sup> The benefit of such a construction is that national freedom of action is not constrained *a priori*. And the Commanding General can also act without restriction, within the limits, of course, given by the directives from both sides.

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<sup>60</sup> Things became a little bit more difficult by creating an additional level between Army Staff (MOD) and corps on the German side, the "Heeresführungskommando" (Army Forces Command) in Koblenz. It took some time to convince the Dutch side that this imbalance was inevitable and that the Commanding General I (GE/NL) Corps had to report to the Commander-in-Chief Army Forces Command, whilst only questions of fundamental importance are left to the Chief of German Army.

<sup>61</sup>"Progress Report on Deeper Integration within the I (GE/NL) Corps" of 1 July 1996.

When he identifies an area, however, in which directives from either side conflict, he can propose an appropriate solution and invite his superiors to take the necessary decisions.

66. The degree of commonality in rules and regulations is, of course, constrained by different conditions which are taken for granted, e.g. variations in recruiting systems, and the fact that only a limited part of the German Army is involved in this particular form of multinationality. The cohesion and identity of the German Army must, of course, be maintained. Sometimes therefore an easy compromise, involving a meeting half-way between the different opinions, is ruled out.<sup>62</sup> On the other side, avoiding too many constraints and limitations for the Commanding General, he has “*a certain degree of flexibility in deviating from national regulations. Deviations from existing national regulations will be judged against the impact on national structures*”.<sup>63</sup>

67. Last year’s “Progress Report”<sup>64</sup> noted that considerable steps forward had been achieved in nearly all areas. No constitutional problems had been identified that could hamper deep integration in the fields of training, exercises and logistics. Some legal constraints concerning the areas of integrated “*directing and control authority*” and bi-national guard were not regarded as resolvable in the short term. But interim solutions should lead to a considerable progress in even these matters. All in all, I (GE/NL) Corps has been running surprisingly well for almost three years. A German general has taken over command in the meantime and many staff positions have been held by the second generation of officers.

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<sup>62</sup> The author in his position as Assistant Chief of Staff for Organisation, Army Staff, MOD Bonn discussed this question with the then Dutch Commander-in-Chief Land Forces General Couzy on 30 August 1995, learning that the Dutch side had already recognised and accepted this inherent problem, which is not to their advantage, in a very fair way, even if it occasionally causes psychological difficulties.

<sup>63</sup> Progress Report 1997, Chapter I, 1. (5).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., Chapter VI.

Initial uncertainties in dealing with each other have been transformed into a real understanding for the peculiarities of the other nation and have become routine.

68. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that fully integrated staff work in many fields has not been practised yet. Varied structures of personnel,<sup>65</sup> resulting in different training demands, inconsistent financial and administrative regulations, insufficient language skills in English,<sup>66</sup> and last but not least, differing military cultures<sup>67</sup> have often hampered this approach. These problems have to be overcome as far as possible, because the headquarters' basic design does not allow national staff work to such an extent.

69. Without any doubt, deep integration grants more benefits in creating a common defence identity and harmonisation of doctrine, training, equipment and logistics than any other model of co-operation. But it takes a great deal of time and effort to implement such an approach, even if the starting position is as favourable as among the German and the Dutch armies. Further attempts in this direction with partner nations, whose armed forces have not enjoyed ties as close as the German and the Dutch Army for decades, would be fraught with difficulty. Consequently, deep integration is not suitable for the planned new corps headquarters including Denmark, Poland and Germany.

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<sup>65</sup> Depending on the all volunteer forces of the Netherlands and the German conscription system.

<sup>66</sup> Particularly among German staff members of lower ranks; see Reitsma, Ruurd, *The 1 (GE-NL) Corps - nichts Besseres aber etwas Besonderes*. Wehrtechnischer Report (GE), November 1996, page 27.

<sup>67</sup> See Janssen, Charles J., *Ein bißchen 'bi' schadet nie* [a little bit 'bi' will never be wrong]: *das Deutsch-Niederländische Korps - Some research findings on post-merger situation, relevant to 1 (GE/NL) Corps*. Fact Sheet 1 (GE/NL) Corps - Press and Information 1996.

Compare also Bergius, Susanne, *Zusammen können sie unschlagbar sein - Synergetische Effekte bei der Zusammenarbeit von niederländischen und deutschen Managern* [Together they might be unbeatable - Synergetic effects by the co-operation of German and Dutch managers]. Handelsblatt (GE Newspaper), 08 February 1996.

## SUMMARY

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

70. Multinationality has been a fundamental principle of NATO's command structure above corps level since 1950. Multinationality as a leading principle for force structures as well has been generally accepted in NATO since 1991. The commitment of forces of NATO nations in UN peace keeping and humanitarian operations, and even more the commitment of NATO itself in former Yugoslavia, have shown that the most likely use of forces in the future will take place as a consequence of multinational political initiatives, in a multinational environment, and with multinational forces. It is evident that the cooperation in multinational formations in peacetime facilitates the conduct of such operations, even when additional troop-providing nations have to be incorporated.

71. ARRC's convincing employment in Bosnia proved the effectiveness of the basic decision for multinationality at this level in NATO. German Army contributions to IFOR and SFOR also benefited from its multinational force structure in many respects. It could, for example, rely on personnel with experience in multinational headquarters and with the necessary language skills.<sup>68</sup> Thus the benefits of multinational force structures are self-evident. In the aftermath of NATO's 1991 decision, five corps and one division have been established according to this principle in the Central Region. As a result of the nations' varying aspirations and political conditions, each of them is of a different type.

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<sup>68</sup> The number of posts in integrated NATO headquarters is too small to generate a sufficient number of officers and NCOs for multinational operations from these personnel alone, particularly as those, who are serving in NATO headquarters at that time, are not readily available. The current Chief of Staff HQ SFOR, for example, is in his normal position Division Commander of 7. Panzer Division which is assigned to ARRC.

72. The lowest degree of integration is realised in the “lead-nation model”. In many respects, corps designed to this model differ very little from purely national formations. They might have a certain political and psychological effect, but have little impact on military education, doctrine, training, and equipment. Nevertheless, this represents the only practical way of getting the US involved in multinational structures at this level, because they, as the superpower, cannot and will not give up the option of conducting military operations at corps level independently, if they so desire. Also, for non-NATO nations which would like to underline and promote their good neighbourliness by visible military measures for political reasons, it might represent a good starting point. Within NATO this model should be reserved for the existing corps. In all other cases, including new NATO members, stronger forms of multinationality should be considered *ab initio*.

73. The “framework model” implies a significantly higher degree of multinational participation. The backbone of this staff system, provided by the leading nation, ensures military effectiveness and cohesion. Even under difficult conditions in war, headquarters designed to this model offer a strong performance in command. Nevertheless, the price of reliability and tight command and control has to be paid for by considerable disadvantages. A lack of equitable representation of all contributing nations can result in reservations and national provisos for the employment of forces. Unofficial national chains of command for units under OPCON of a NATO or UN commander are often the undesirable result.

74. In the most likely case for the use of forces, broad political and military involvement is desirable or even indispensable. Troop-providing nations are generally interested in adequate and visible representation at the command level. This is best guaranteed by headquarters designed according to the “integration model”.



The objection of military effectiveness cannot be used against this model, which has been practised by all integrated NATO headquarters for decades, not only from Army Group level upwards, but also at corps level (LANDJUT) or even lower (AMF). There is sufficient time available to train headquarters' staffs for any kind of operation when not employed. It has to be conceded, however, that the practical difficulties in creating effectively functioning headquarters increase, as the level of command decreases. The activities of corps headquarters are mainly about operations, whereas lower headquarters additionally have to deal with the practical details of logistics and administration, where different national procedures are most pronounced. Therefore multinationality should be established mainly at corps level for the time being. If in future an even more stable security situation in Europe allows further significant force reductions, the divisional level might be included in multinational force structures beyond the existing two multinational divisions. The "integration model" should be considered for the ARRC as well as for possible new initiatives to include the future new NATO member nations in multinational force structures.

75. As for the design of integrated corps headquarters, there is often no better alternative for the equitable distribution of top positions among the participating nations other than the rotation system, despite difficulties for national personnel departments in adjusting their top officers' career moves to fit the inherently small windows of opportunity. The number of rotational post, however, should be minimised to avoid unnecessary co-ordination measures among several nations when deviations from the agreed rotation period become necessary. The remaining posts, particularly key positions, must be distributed fairly amongst the nations according to their respective contributions. To satisfy as many aspirations as possible, such headquarters tend to become top heavy, although this should be avoided where practicable.

Furthermore the construction is not amenable to having all participating nations represented at the level of Deputy Commander, irrespective of representation in other key positions as practised in the EURO-Corps. As a matter of principle, multinational headquarters should not be significantly bigger than comparable national headquarters.

76. Language is often a problem in multinational formations.<sup>69</sup> Since France left the integrated military structure of NATO, English has become the unquestioned common military language of the Alliance. But with the EURO-Corps and its double commitment the situation has become more complicated. Not least, SFOR operations in former Yugoslavia have shown how difficult it is, even for the German Army with its common formations with France, to generate a sufficient number of qualified personnel able to speak English and French reasonably well. It might be regarded as unfair by some nations to agree upon one common language, but it is of vital importance in operations to understand each other. Therefore the working language in NATO's and WEU's multinational formations should be English.

77. Depth of integration must also be considered very carefully. Political aspirations in this respect often lack a sound legal basis and cannot be implemented in a militarily sensible manner. German attempts in this field with France and the Netherlands advocate caution. The Franco-German Brigade and the German-Netherlands Corps are certainly important steps on the path towards a united Europe and the promotion of a European Security and Defence Identity. Even in these cases under very favourable pre-conditions, however, the effort required to exercise effective command and control in an appropriate manner has been considerable. The time does not yet seem to be ripe for extending these steps further.

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<sup>69</sup> Compare Palin, Roger H., l.c., page 40-42.

The same fundamental principle can be seen to apply to both deep integration and multinational structures in general: the lower the level of command, the more difficult the problems of smooth command and control. But even at corps level, deep integration would not seem to be the best solution for further development of multinational force structures in NATO for the time being.

78. Irrespective of whether the European unification process maintains its momentum, irrespective of whether the European Union even retains strong nation states as opposed to a federal system, multinational force structures will become increasingly important in future. The expansion of NATO offers particularly significant prospects for this type of development. Although this paper has focused on the situation of NATO forces in Central Europe, several conclusions can be equally applied to other parts of Europe, and possibly to other regions and political circumstances too. In any case, experience gained from existing multinational headquarters should be taken into account whenever future force structures are under consideration. This paper has attempted to highlight some of their possibilities and limitations.

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### NATO Ministerial Communiqué Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991.

#### 1. Paragraph 1:

*“A transformed Atlantic Alliance constitutes an essential element in the new architecture of an undivided Europe; we are agreed that the Alliance must have the flexibility to continue to develop and evolve as the security situation dictates. An important basis for this transformation is the agreement of all Allies to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members. We welcome efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognise the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy. ... The **development of a European security identity and defence role**, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, **will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.**“*

(emphasised by the author)

### NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 26 and 27 May 1992.

#### 2. Paragraph 6:

*“We reaffirm our support for the development of the WEU as the defence component of the European Union and a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.*

*We welcome the enhancement of the WEU's operational capabilities **in ways which will be compatible with and complementary to NATO's collective defence arrangements, and which will help to ensure the necessary co-operation and mutual transparency between the political and military structures of the two organisations.** In this context we noted that, in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, the WEU member states are engaged in identifying forces answerable to WEU drawing on those with NATO or national roles. We stressed the importance of **maintaining existing assignments to NATO of forces being considered for use by the WEU, recognising that the primary responsibility of these forces is to meet the collective defence commitments of the Alliance,** ... We agreed that ... **we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends.** ... We look forward to the further development of the European Security and Defence Identity, strengthening the solidarity and cohesion of the transatlantic partnership.“* (emphasised by the author)



**NATO Ministerial Communiqué Brussels, 11 December 1992.**

**3. Paragraph 6:**

*“The crisis in former Yugoslavia has underlined the importance of effective cooperation between the various institutional components of the new European security architecture. ... NATO will remain, as was agreed in Rome and Maastricht, the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members ...; NATO's collective defence will therefore remain the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU. We continue to attach importance to mutual transparency and complementarity between NATO and the WEU. ... We also welcome the strengthening of the organisation and the operational role of the WEU, notably the recent establishment in Brussels of the WEU Planning Cell. We look forward to the forthcoming move of the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels which will further contribute to improved cooperation between NATO and the WEU.*”

**4. Paragraph 7:**

*“We welcomed the initiative of France and Germany to establish a European Corps that is intended to be available for Alliance missions and thus to provide a significant contribution to strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. SACEUR is now undertaking negotiations with the two Chiefs of Defence Staff concerned to establish a special agreement setting out the detailed arrangements for the availability of the Corps in the framework of the Alliance.”*

**NATO Ministerial Communiqué Madrid 8 July 1997.**

**5. Paragraph 3:**

*“While maintaining our core function of collective defence, we have adapted our political and military structures to improve our ability to meet the new challenges of regional crisis and conflict management. NATO's continued contribution to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unprecedented scale of cooperation with other countries and international organisations there, reflect the cooperative approach which is key to building our common security. A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe.*”

**6. Paragraph 17:**

*We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the CJTF concept, including the initial designation of parent headquarters, and look forward to the forthcoming trials. This concept will enhance our ability to command and control multinational and multiservice forces, generated and deployed at short notice, which are capable of conducting a wide range of military operations. Combined Joint Task Forces will also facilitate the possible participation of non-NATO nations in operations and, by enabling the conduct of WEU-led CJTF operations, will contribute to the development of ESDI within the Alliance.”*